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NORMING IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
 
 
Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner1 
 
 
How do regulatory agencies decide how strictly to regulate an 
industry? They sometimes use cost-benefit analysis or claim to, but 
more often the standards they invoke are so vague as to be 
meaningless. This raises the question whether the agencies use an 
implicit standard or instead regulate in an ad hoc fashion. We argue 
that agencies frequently use an approach that we call “norming.” 
They survey the practices of firms in a regulated industry and 
choose a standard somewhere within the distribution of existing 
practices, often no higher than the median. Such a standard burdens 
only the firms whose practices lag the industry. We then evaluate 
this approach. While a case can be made that norming is appropriate 
when a regulatory agency operates in an environment of extreme 
uncertainty, we argue that on balance norming is an unwise form of 
regulation. Its major attraction for agencies is that it minimizes 
political opposition to regulation. Norming does not serve the public 
interest as well as a more robust standard like cost-benefit analysis. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 A furious debate about how government agencies should regulate 
when they are authorized to do so under general statutory mandates has 
mostly neglected the question of how agencies do regulate. The two questions 
are different, of course. The “should” question has focused in recent years on 
the role of cost-benefit analysis, with scholars taking sides pro or con, and 
some scholars advocating other standards like feasibility analysis.2 In this 
debate, scholars cite agency regulatory impact statements (RIAs) and related 
materials, and judicial opinions, but mainly to criticize or defend the 
agencies’ explanations for their regulations. They do not usually question the 
agencies’ explanations or try to figure out the real springs of agency action. 
                                                 
1 University of Chicago Law School. Thanks to Cass Sunstein and Jennifer Nou for 
helpful comments and to Kyle Trevett for excellent research assistance. 
2 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF REGULATORY 
PROTECTION (1996); RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING 
RATIONALITY: HOW COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT 
AND OUR HEALTH (2011); MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF 
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS (2006); FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON 
KNOWING THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2005). 
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 A smaller literature looks at what agencies do. Some scholars provide 
detailed case studies that report and evaluate the reasoning used by agencies.3 
Others have produced studies that evaluate agency regulations in aggregate 
to see if they generate benefits or costs, with mixed results.4 A strand of the 
literature focuses on political influences on agencies.5 But there is little 
attention to how agencies decide whether to regulate, and—of particular 
interest to us—how they decide on the level of regulatory strictness once they 
have decided to regulate.  
 In this Article, we suggest that agencies often use a distinctive style 
of decision-making, which we call “norming.” A norm is “a set standard of 
development or achievement usually derived from the average or median 
achievement of a large group.”6 We convert the noun into a verb to capture 
what we think agencies are doing. In deciding how strict to make a regulation, 
agencies may choose a level of strictness that puts significant burdens on 
industry outliers—the firms with the worst practices—while putting limited 
burdens or none at all to the firms whose practices are of average quality or 
better. We call this practice “norming” because it allows the statistical 
norm—reflecting the actual practices of industries—to provide the source of 
the regulatory standard. This should have the effect of truncating the 
distribution at the low-quality end. 
 While agencies do not use the word “norming” to describe their 
decision-making procedures, we show that they often engage in this behavior. 
In some cases, a statute directs an agency to engage in norming. In other 
cases, agencies have interpreted statutes to allow or require them to engage 
in norming. And in still other cases, agencies seem to engage in norming in 
tandem with other approaches, like feasibility analysis or cost-benefit 
analysis. 
 After providing background in Part I, we document several instances 
of norming in Part II. Our goal is not to survey agency behavior exhaustively 
but to persuade the reader that norming is a sufficiently important agency 
                                                 
3 W. KIP VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR RISK 
(1992); Cass R. Sunstein, The Arithmetic of Arsenic (John M. Olin Program in Law and 
Economics Working Paper No. 135, 2001); DAVID L. HARFST & JERRY L. MASHAW, THE 
STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY (1990) (automobile safety regulation by DOT and NHTSA). 
See also Caroline Cecot & W. Kip Viscusi, Judicial Review of Agency Benefit-Cost Analysis, 
22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 575 (2015) (discussing judicial review of CBAs). 
4 E.g., Robert W. Hahn & Patrick M. Dudley, “How Well Does the Government Do 
Cost-Benefit Analysis?” (AEI-Brookings Joint Center Working Paper No. 04-01, 2004).  
5 GEORGE J. STIGLER, CHICAGO STUDIES IN POLITICAL ECONOMY (1988); Jean-Jacques 
Laffont & Jean Tirole, The Politics of Government Decision-Making: A Theory of Regulatory 
Capture 106 Q. J. of Econ. 1089 (1991).  
6 “Norm,” Merriam-Webster, 2017, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/norm (last visited Jan. 3., 2018).  
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practice to deserve scholarly and public attention. In Part III, we evaluate 
norming from the standpoint of the public good. Agencies often engage in 
norming, but should they? An argument can be made that norming is a 
reasonable way to proceed when regulators are highly uncertain about best 
practices, but we argue that cost-benefit analysis is the better approach. The 
problem with norming is that often even the average or high-quality practices 
within an industry cause harm to the public, justifying a regulatory response. 
We suggest that the major reason for norming is that it is politically attractive. 
Industry opposition to regulation is often intense, but when the burden of 
regulation falls on only the worst firms, the industry may not be opposed to 
it. The leading firms in the industry may even support the regulation because 
the outliers harm the reputation of the industry or pose costly threats to the 
dominance of the stronger firms. Finally, in Part IV, we further illustrate the 
attraction and limitations of norming by discussing instances in which courts 
have engaged in norming. The most familiar example comes from the 
jurisprudence of the Eighth Amendment, which requires courts to strike down 
punishments that are, in terms of harshness, outliers from the statistical 
distribution represented by the states. 
 
I.  REGULATORY STANDARDS AND DECISION PROCEDURES 
 
A. Legal Standards 
 
 When Congress creates administrative agencies and gives them 
directions, it usually uses broad language that is susceptible to multiple 
interpretations. For example, one section of the Clean Air Act, which governs 
emissions from power plants, instructs the EPA to issue regulations that are 
“appropriate and necessary.”7 The language means not only that the EPA 
should issue regulations when appropriate and necessary, but that the 
strictness of a regulation should be “appropriate and necessary.” Anytime an 
agency regulates, it must choose a level of strictness, and that level could 
range from zero or de minimis, to extreme—in this case, for example, 
mandating an emission level of zero, which would destroy the power 
industry. Congress evidently wanted EPA to avoid both extremes but gave 
no guidance as to how strict the regulation should be, within the vast range 
between de minimis and maximal. 
In other cases, Congress provided more concrete instructions while 
still leaving much to the agency’s discretion. For instance, one section of the 
Clean Water Act instructs the EPA to mandate the “best technology available 
for minimizing adverse environmental impact.”8 This language is less vague 
                                                 
7 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A). 
8 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b). 
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than “appropriate and necessary,” but it still leaves much in doubt. Is the 
“best” technology the most effective (i.e., cleanest) technology, or the most 
efficient (i.e., cost-effective) technology? For a technology to be “available,” 
must it already be in use, or can it be on the drawing board? And so forth.9 
Agencies address these ambiguities by offering interpretations or 
relying on decision procedures, which are reported in various regulatory 
documents. Under the Chevron doctrine, courts accept reasonable 
interpretations.10 The courts have sanctioned regulations based on cost-
benefit analysis as well as regulations based on other types of 
methodologies.11 However, the fact that an agency has legal authority under 
Chevron to select a particular level of regulation does not mean that the level 
of regulation it selected was well-chosen. Agencies have been criticized 
frequently both for excessively strict and insufficiently strict regulation.12 
These criticisms are often based on cost-benefit analyses, which evaluated 
regulations by comparing the burden on industry with the monetized benefits 
the regulations sought to achieve. In an effort to remedy this problem, a 
succession of presidents (beginning with Reagan and extending through 
Obama and Trump) have required most agencies to produce a cost-benefit 
analysis each time it promulgates a regulation with an economic impact of 
more than $100 million per year.13 This requirement has become 
entrenched.14  
 The fact that agencies are required to perform cost-benefit analysis 
when regulating does not mean that they always use cost-benefit analysis to 
decide how stringently to regulate. In some cases, statutes appear to bar the 
agencies from relying on a cost-benefit analysis. Moreover, even when they 
use cost-benefit analysis, often different levels of regulatory strictness may 
all be consistent with a cost-benefit standard. Accordingly, agencies have 
                                                 
9 The administrative state is far too vast, and the various regulatory statutes far too 
numerous, for us to canvas even a small portion of them here. For a partial catalog of major 
regulatory provisions, which highlights the many variations in regulatory language, see 
Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Judicial Role, 85 U. Chi. 
L. Rev. (forthcoming 2018) (hereinafter “Judicial Role”) (Appendix). 
10 Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Counsel, 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Jonathan S. 
Masur & Eric A. Posner, Against Feasibility Analysis, 77 U Chi. L. Rev. 657 (2010).  
11 Jacob Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Thin Rationality Review, 114 Mich. L. Rev. 1355 
(2016) (documenting cases in which courts have been deferential to agency choice of 
methodology); Caroline Cecot & W. Kip Viscusi, Judicial Review of Agency Benefit-Cost 
Analysis, 22 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 575 (2015) (documenting judicial deference to agency cost-
benefit analysis). 
12 STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982).  
13 Exec. Order No. 12291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13193 (Feb. 17, 1981). 
14 See Masur & Posner, Judicial Role, supra note 8, at 8 (observing that the executive 
requirement of cost-benefit analysis has remained in force across every presidential 
administration since Reagan).  
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typically relied upon a number of different decision procedures or 
methodologies for selecting regulatory standards, which we describe below.15 
 
B. Decision Procedures 
  
 Cost-benefit analysis. Under a cost-benefit analysis, an agency issues 
a regulation if the benefits exceed the costs. The costs typically include the 
expense of compliance, which may involve installing safety devices, training 
workers, and discontinuing production methods—capital and labor expenses 
borne by industry, passed on to consumers as higher prices, shareholders as 
lower returns, and workers as lower wages or layoffs. The benefits typically 
involve improvements in public health, safety, convenience, and other forms 
of well-being. The major virtue of cost-benefit analysis is that if (as is often 
claimed) the regulator’s goal is to improve public welfare, the decision 
procedure enables the agency to identify all aspects of public welfare that the 
regulation might affect, and provides a straightforward means for evaluating 
it. 
 The simple formulation masks numerous complexities and problems, 
both normative and methodological—the topic of a vast literature.16 We will 
not rehearse these problems here, except to note one of them which is relevant 
to our current topic. Because of the complexity of the economy and human 
behavior, it is often difficult to determine whether an incremental increase in 
the stringency of the regulation will produce more net benefits or more net 
costs. Agencies that demand a high degree of certainty before regulating may 
thus end up regulating too little, while agencies that forge ahead despite 
uncertainty are often accused of recklessness. For the same reason, agencies 
may find it difficult to defend reasonable but speculative judgments when 
their regulations are challenged in court.17 
 
 Feasibility analysis. Because some statutes require agencies to 
implement regulations where “feasible,” an idea has developed that agencies 
should conduct “feasibility analysis,” which means that the agency should 
regulate as strictly as possible short of driving firms or industries out of 
                                                 
15 C.R.S. Rep. No. R41561 (2016) 
16 See, e.g., ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 2, at 37-40; John C. Coates IV, 
Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case Studies and Implications, 124 Yale L. 
J. 882 (2014); Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Empty Call for Benefit-Cost Analysis in Financial 
Regulation, 43 J. Legal Stud. 351 (2014) 
17 See Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Unquantified Benefits and the Problem of 
Regulation Under Uncertainty, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 86 (2015) (hereinafter “Unquantified 
Benefits”), for a discussion. See also Amy Sinden, The Problem of Unquantified Benefits, 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3087370 (unpublished manuscript 
2017). 
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business.18 Agencies that conduct feasibility analysis sometimes try to predict 
a regulation’s effect on unemployment within the industry, and they curtail 
regulation if the predicted effect seems excessive; at other times, they try to 
predict how many firms will be driven into bankruptcy, and again curtail 
regulation if the number seems too large. 
 Feasibility analysis is, in principle, a simpler and more manageable 
procedure than cost-benefit analysis because the regulator does not need to 
evaluate all the effects of a regulation, only some of them. But this is also the 
chief objection to feasibility analysis. Because consumers and investors incur 
costs from regulation, and their well-being is part of the public good, their 
losses should be taken into account by the agency.19 Other problems with 
feasibility analysis includes its focus on business failure (which is not 
necessarily bad), and the ambiguity of the regulatory standard. 
 
 Narrow tradeoffs (for example, risk-risk). In some cases, agencies 
focus on a few of the most important and salient effects of regulations while 
ignoring others.20 Consider, for example, a regulation that approves a 
pharmaceutical. The drug might reduce the risk of one bad outcome 
(including death) but also create risks of others. In risk-risk analysis, the 
agency evaluates a regulation according to its impact on a narrow range of 
severe risks (death or serious injury or illness) while ignoring other effects 
on well-being, which may be difficult to quantify. 
 Like feasibility analysis, risks-risk analysis neglects many of the 
welfare effects of regulation. Risk is not the only thing that matters; so does, 
for example, the price tag on an automobile. 
 
 Quality-adjusted life years and cost-effectiveness analysis. In 
healthcare regulation, an ambitious effort has been made to evaluate medical 
procedures according to how much they extend life adjusted by quality.21 The 
approach reflects the intuition that a medical procedure that extends life by 
10 years but also does not alleviate suffering might be worse than an 
alternative medical procedure that extends life by 8 years but does alleviate 
                                                 
18 See David M. Driesen, Distributing the Cost of Environmental, Health, and Safety 
Regulation: The Feasibility Principle, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Reform, 32 B.C. ENVTL. 
AFF. L. REV. 1 (2005).  
19 Masur & Posner, Against Feasibility Analysis, supra note 10, at 682-84. But see David 
M. Driesen, Two Cheers for Feasible Regulation, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313, 318-20 
(2011). 
20 Jonathan Baert Wiener & John D. Graham, Resolving Risk Tradeoffs, in RISK VERSUS 
RISK: TRADEOFFS IN PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT 226, 228-29 (John D. 
Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener eds., 1995). 
21 Matthew D. Adler, QALYS and Policy Evaluation: A New Perspective, 6 YALE 
HEALTH POL’Y & ETHICS 1, 12-15 (2006). 
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suffering. The QALY approach is meant to reflect that individuals often 
prefer the second procedure to the first. Since cost remains a consideration—
hospitals cannot spend an infinite amount of money on medical procedures—
but is not directly included in the analysis, this type of procedure is a type of 
cost-effectiveness analysis. On this approach, the question is, given a budget, 
how is that budget best spent to advance well-being. A virtue of this approach 
is it avoids the problems of monetization. The defect is that a budget must be 
determined, and it is hard to see how the agency (or Congress) can determine 
the budget in the first place without performing cost-benefit analysis or 
another form of welfare analysis. 
 
Break-even analysis. Sometimes an agency is able to estimate the 
costs of a regulation but not the benefits (or, on rare occasions, the benefits 
but not the costs). This might be because the benefits are hard to price, but it 
is more commonly used when the benefits themselves are simply uncertain, 
such as when the agency is unsure how many premature deaths the regulation 
is likely to prevent.22 In such a case, an agency employing break-even 
analysis would calculate the “break-even point”: the quantity of benefits that 
the regulation must produce in order for costs to equal benefits.23 Thus, for 
instance, imagine that a regulation is expected to cost $100 million, and the 
agency values each life saved at $10 million. The break-even point for this 
regulation is ten lives. 
The problem with break-even analysis is that it does not actually tell 
the agency whether or not to regulate (much less how stringently to 
regulate).24 In the example above, what good does it do the agency to know 
that the break-even point is ten lives if (by hypothesis) the agency does not 
know how many lives the regulation will save? In order to actually make 
decisions, the agency must formulate some estimate of the likely benefits or 
have some intuitive sense of whether benefits will exceed costs. Break-even 
analysis thus often reduces to a kind of incomplete cost-benefit analysis. 
  
Intuitive (or ad hoc) balancing. This approach involves a broad and 
comprehensive look at all the possible effects of regulation, akin to cost-
benefit analysis, but without monetization of the benefits (and sometimes the 
costs as well). In these cases, the agency often insists that the benefits cannot 
be reliably monetized because of the uncertainty of the effects of the 
                                                 
22 Regulation does not actually “save lives,” in the sense that everyone will die 
eventually. Accordingly, some experts speak of regulation as “prolonging life” or 
“preventing premature death.” We use these various terms interchangeably here. 
23 Daniel A. Farber, Breaking Bad? The Uneasy Case for Regulatory Breakeven 
Analysis, 102 CAL. L. REV. 1469, 1487-89 (2014). 
24 Masur & Posner, Unquantified Benefits, supra note 17, at 93.  
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regulation or the nature of the benefits, which can be intangible and abstract, 
such as the pleasure that people derive from knowing that wilderness is 
preserved even if they do not visit it.25 When the agency regulates, it does so 
on the ground that the benefits justify the costs even though a formal cost-
benefit analysis cannot be performed. 
 Intuitive balancing is ubiquitous in daily life as well as in government. 
When employers offer amenities to employees, they often rely on a rough 
intuitive sense and do not bother trying to do a cost-benefit analysis, which 
may be unreliable. When governments build monuments, parks, and other 
public amenities, they will typically calculate the costs but often rely on a 
rough sense of the public interest in these amenities rather than try to 
monetize the benefits. Thus, intuitive balancing should not be dismissed out 
of hand. But its major defect is that because benefits and costs are not fully 
monetized, they decisionmaker may make an error or be subject to some type 
of bias. It is also difficult for outsiders, including researchers and auditors, to 
evaluate the project. 
 
 Democratic procedures. Finally, agencies always solicit the views of 
regulated entities, as they are required by law, but sometimes they go farther 
and try to arrange agreements, votes, and other forms of participation among 
those directly affected by a regulatory program. Within constraints, and 
subject to the agency’s supervision, a form of democracy prevails, in the 
sense that the ultimate regulation or project emerges from debate and 
presumably reflects the self-interested calculations of the affected parties.26 
Under the democratic approach, the agency avoids the burden of evaluating 
potential regulations based on a notion of the public good, but takes the risk 
that the democratic procedure it chooses ends up excluding some affected 
people or giving improper weight to sophisticated parties who figure out how 
to game the system. 
 There are not always distinct lines between these approaches: overall, 
agencies frequently adopt a kind of pluralistic approach, defending their 
regulations by claiming that they are consistent with multiple decision 
procedures. Agencies often estimate valuations and report them without 
performing a complete cost-benefit analysis, or estimate some valuations 
while ignoring others.27 Regulatory impact analyses often include a range of 
overlapping approaches. In many of them, agencies seem to engage in 
intuitive balancing and cost-benefit analysis, and also to take account 
                                                 
25 Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Moral Commitments in Cost-Benefit Analysis, VA. 
L. REV. (forthcoming 2018)..  
26 For some examples, see Karen Bradshaw, Democratic Risk Management 
(unpublished manuscript 2017).  
27 Masur & Posner, Unquantified Benefits, supra note 17, at 112-115, 
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concerns about feasibility and unemployment.28 And, as we will demonstrate, 
actual agency practice often involves a kind of norming, even if the agency 
is nominally using one of these other decision procedures. 
 
II. NORMING IN PRACTICE 
 
A. What Is Norming? 
 
 Norming is yet another approach to regulation. It can take different 
forms, and so to ground intuitions, we start with a simple example. 
 Imagine that the EPA must regulate a particular practice in a 
particular industry, for example, ozone emissions from power plants. Upon 
investigation, it learns that the various power plants emit different amounts 
of ozone. There could be various reasons for this variation. For example, 
some plants might have been constructed more recently with the best new 
technology, which results in less ozone emission just because of the 
efficiency of that technology. Alternatively, some plants might have better 
technology because they are operated more cautiously by managers who 
worry about legal and reputational consequences, or because they are located 
in states or other jurisdictions where local legal standards for pollution are 
stricter. Or plants might not emit much ozone because of the particularities 
of their location, which might allow them to use inputs or adopt production 
processes that generate less ozone than other plants do. We can imagine many 
other reasons; we explore some of them below. For now, the basic point is 
that there will be natural variation in ozone emissions across plants. 
 The exact shape of that distribution will also depend on the 
circumstances, but our argument does not depend on that shape having any 
specific form. The major point is that all (realistic) distributions have tails. 
At the right tail, firms emit more ozone than other firms; at the left tail, they 
emit less. In the middle of the distribution, the firms cluster around average 
levels of emissions. We also bracket, within limits, the nature of the variable 
in question. The EPA may be concerned about the overall level of emission 
per plant; or the level of emission relative to something else, like units of 
production; or the costs that the firms have incurred in reducing emissions. 
The variable will be normatively relevant to whatever EPA’s statutory 
mandate is—presumably, to advance the well-being of people who are 
exposed to the pollution, or of people generally (including consumers and 
workers). 
 To understand what norming is, let’s start with how the EPA would 
approach the problem of setting a level of regulatory strictness using cost-
                                                 
28 Id. at 117-18. 
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benefit analysis. In principle, the EPA could require firms to reduce ozone 
emissions to zero (equivalently: to install expensive technology or shut down 
production), or the EPA could impose a de minimis regulation (requiring the 
plants to do nothing at all), or anything in between. A cost-benefit analysis 
tells the EPA to set the level that maximizes benefits (usually in terms of 
human health, including reduced mortality risk, lower medical expenses, and 
so on) net of costs (the costs to the firms). The best regulation based on a 
cost-benefit analysis could turn out to require all firms, most firms, or a few 
firms, or no firms, to reduce emissions. Everything depends on what the 
underlying variables are. 
 In the case of norming, the EPA derives from the distribution itself 
the proper level of regulation. We define norming to mean that the EPA sets 
the level of regulatory strictness somewhere between the best firm and zero. 
Every firm that exceeds the standard may continue to conduct business as 
usual. Every firm that falls below the standard must bring its production into 
compliance with the standard.  
 
Figure 1: Norming 
 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the simple point we are trying to make. Imagine 
that the horizontal axis represents a variable of interest to the regulator—such 
as the amount of pollution that a factory emits, increasing from left to right. 
The vertical axis represents the number of factories at any given level of 
pollution. While Figure 1 shows a normal curve, the distribution could have 
any shape. The vertical line shows the “norm” chosen by the regulator. The 
factories that fall to the right of the vertical line are out of regulatory 
compliance. If the regulation is enforced, those factories will be either shut 
down or brought into compliance. As a result, the right tail of the post-
regulation distribution will be truncated. 
While the regulation at Figure 1 sets the standard at the median 
factory, an agency that engages in norming, as we define it, could set the 
standard at any location along the distribution. A weak standard would be 
located at the right side of the distribution; nearly all firms would be in 
compliance. A strict standard would be located at the left side of the 
distribution; nearly all firms would be out of compliance. The distinctive 
feature of norming is that the regulatory standard is internal to existing 
practices of the industry—it is based on the distribution of existing firm 
11 
 
practices—rather than derived from exogenous factors like cost, benefit, and 
risk. 
Another question raised by norming is the nature of the variable of 
interest to the regulator. In our example, we suggested that an agency might 
be concerned about the amount of pollution emitted per factory. However, an 
agency might care more about the amount of pollution per unit of production, 
or per unit of social benefit, or the social harm per unit of production, or some 
other measure. As we will see below, agencies norm on the basis of a range 
of different variables. 
In some cases, agencies explicitly acknowledge that they are engaging 
in norming, and sometimes the governing statutes even require it. This is 
particularly true in the context of environmental law. In other cases, another 
type of decision procedure (such as feasibility analysis) reduces to norming 
as it is practiced by agencies. Finally, in a third category of cases, agencies 
engage in norming as a shortcut, anticipating that it will lead to good (though 
not ideal) regulation.  
In the sections that follow, we survey some of the most important 
regulatory agencies, spanning a wide variety of areas of law. We demonstrate 
the ways in which those agencies rely upon norming in their regulatory 
decision-making. 
 
B. Environmental Law 
 
 The EPA relies substantially upon norming. In some cases, a statute 
explicitly directs the agency to engage in norming; in other cases, the agency 
has interpreted its governing statutes to require norming, even when other 
options might be available. Here, we focus upon two EPA case studies, one 
based upon the Clean Water Act, and one based upon the Clean Air Act. We 
then briefly survey other sections of the environmental laws and describe the 
ways in which they require the EPA to engage in norming as well. 
  
1. Clean Water Act. 
 
The Clean Water Act requires the EPA to regulate the discharge of 
conventional pollutants from existing point sources by mandating the “best 
practicable control technology currently available.”29 The statute further 
directs the EPA to determine the best practicable control technology by 
considering: 
 
                                                 
29 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(A). 
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the total cost of application of technology in relation to the effluent 
reduction benefits to be achieved from such application, … the age of 
equipment and facilities involved, the process employed, the 
engineering aspects of the application of various types of control 
techniques, process changes, non-water quality environmental impact 
. . . and such other factors as the Administrator deems appropriate . . 
. .30 
 
In applying this language, the EPA has employed a regulatory methodology 
that it terms “average of the best.” The EPA identifies the best-performing 
polluters within the category of polluters being regulated, where the “best-
performing” polluters are those who emit the least pollution, and requires all 
the polluters to perform as well as the average of the best-performing 
polluters—hence, “average of the best.” The “average of the best” standard 
appears to have originated in congressional debates over the Clean Water Act 
in 1972.31 The standard was initially proposed by Senator Edmund Muskie, 
the sponsor and principal drafter of the Clean Water Act, during Senate floor 
debates over the Clean Water Act.32  
One example of this methodology comes from the EPA’s 1987 
regulation of producers of organic compounds, plastics, and synthetic 
fibers.33 Manufacturers of these products emit a wide variety of hazardous 
pollutants.34 In the course of its regulation, the EPA first identified 304 
sources of pollution (factories) that would be subject to regulation.35 It then 
selected the 99 sources (of these 304) that were employing the “best” 
technology to control emissions.36 (The agency concluded that the best 
technology was “biologic treatment,” followed by “secondary clarification as 
necessary to assure adequate treatment of solids.”)37 Of these 99 sources, the 
EPA then selected the 71 plants that had achieved the greatest pollution 
                                                 
30 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(1)(B). 
31 Thomas B. Arnold, Effluent Limitations and NPDES: Federal and State 
Implementation of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 15 B.C. L. 
REV. 767, 767-83 (1974). 
32 118 Cong. Rec. 33696 (1972) (“The Administrator should establish the range of "best 
practicable" levels based upon the average of the best existing performance by plants of 
various sizes, ages, and unit processes within each industrial category.”). 
33 EPA, Organic Chemicals and Plastics and Synthetic Fibers Category Effluent 
Limitations Guidelines, Pretreatment Standards, and New Source Performance Standards, 52 
Fed. Reg. 42,522 (1987). 
34 Id. at 42,526-27. 
35 Chemical Manufacturers Association v. EPA, 870 F.2d 177, 208-09 (5th Cir. 1989). 
36 Id. at 208; EPA, Organic Chemicals and Plastics and Synthetic Fibers Guidelines, 
supra note 30 at 42, 534-35. 
37 EPA, Organic Chemicals and Plastics and Synthetic Fibers Guidelines, supra note 30 
at 42, 534. 
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reduction—the plants whose emissions were no more than 40 mg of pollutant 
material per liter of water discharged into the public waterways.38 The EPA 
set the regulatory standard equal to the average level of pollution control of 
these 71 plants.39 
 At first glance, it might appear as though the EPA has normed to a 
fairly stringent degree. In setting the regulatory standard equal to the average 
of the best 71 plants, the agency pegged its regulation to (approximately) the 
36th-best-performing source, out of 304 sources subject to the regulation. 
This is roughly the 88th percentile of all existing sources. However, the 
agency makes clear that the regulation would not be nearly so onerous as that 
description might sound. According to the agency, the appropriate 
technology was already “in place at 156 of 304 direct discharging plants” to 
be regulated.40 Accordingly, of the 304 regulated emitters of pollution, 
roughly 36 would already be in compliance with the regulation, and another 
120 have the necessary pollution control equipment in place and need only to 
operate it properly. Only 148 of 304 plants (49%) were required to construct 
or install new equipment, at a total cost of $215.8 million.41 Thus, the norm 
was set close to the median, as in Figure 1. 
 This regulation dealt with “conventional” pollutants, which are 
governed under the Clean Water Act by the “best practicable technology” 
standard. Other sections of the Clean Water Act variously direct the EPA to 
mandate the “best technology available for minimizing adverse 
environmental impact,”42 the “best conventional pollutant control 
technology,”43 the “best available technology economically achievable,”44 
and the “best available demonstrated control technology.”45 Each of these 
standards involves some type of norming, typically selected by the EPA with 
regard to the legislative history of the Clean Water Act. For instance, the “best 
available technology economically achievable” applies to the EPA’s 
regulation of “toxic” pollutants, such as cyanide, which are especially 
harmful to human health and can be fatal in small doses.46 Here, too, the 
language is ambiguous and could permit the application of a variety of 
potential standards. And here, too, the EPA has adopted a particular rule 
based upon its reading of the legislative history. When regulating under the 
                                                 
38 Id. at 42, 534-35. 
39 Chemical Manufacturers Association, 870 F.2d at 208. 
40 EPA, Organic Chemicals and Plastics and Synthetic Fibers Guidelines, supra note 30 
at 42,536-37. 
41 Id. at 42,537. 
42 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b) 
43 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(E) 
44 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A)(i). 
45 33 U.S.C. § 1316(a)(1) 
46 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A)(i). 
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“best available technology” standard, the EPA pegs its regulation to the single 
best-performing plant—the source with the lowest level of pollution 
emitted.47 
This is, of course, the most stringent possible version of norming—
norming to the furthest outlier. However, while this is the most stringent 
statutory standard contained within the Clean Water Act,48 even this standard 
directs the agency to regulate based upon technology that already exists and 
is in use within the industry. The agency does not mandate the development 
or installation of new technology that no firm yet employs.  
  
2. Clean Air Act 
  
 Unlike the Clean Water Act, the Clean Air Act includes a statutory 
standard that explicitly demands norming. Section 112 of the Clean Air Act 
authorizes the EPA to regulate sources of “hazardous” pollutants, which are 
particularly dangerous airborne chemicals that Congress and the agency have 
selected and listed.49 The statute requires that the EPA regulate so as to 
produce “the maximum degree of reduction in emissions of the hazardous air 
pollutants.”50 The statute then defines “maximum degree of reduction” 
differently for new pollution sources—those that are constructed after 
regulation is already in place—and existing sources, those that predate 
regulation. For new sources, the statute provides that the EPA must prescribe 
emissions standards that are at least as stringent as “the emission control that 
is achieved in practice by the best controlled similar source.”51 This is 
equivalent to the Clean Water Act’s “best available control technology” 
standard, though here it is written into the statute rather than having been 
created by the agency. For existing sources of pollution, the statute directs 
the EPA to promulgate standards that are at least as stringent as “the average 
emission limitation achieved by the best performing 12 percent of the existing 
                                                 
47 Kennecott v. EPA, 780 F.2d 445, 448 (4th Cir. 1985); A Legislative History of the 
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (Comm. Print 1973), 
at 170, 798. The production of organic chemicals, plastics, and synthetic fibers also involves 
the release of these types of chemicals, and so the EPA set limits on those types of pollutants 
in the same regulation as well. Chemical Manufacturers Association, 870 F.2d at 226-27; 
EPA, Organic Chemicals and Plastics and Synthetic Fibers Guidelines, supra note 30 at 
42,538-40. David Driesen describes this approach as “follow-the-leader.” David Driesen, 
Distributing the Costs of Environmental, Health, and Safety Protection, supra note 19 at 44-
46 (2005). 
48 Entergy v. Riverkeeper, 556 U.S. 208 (2009) 
49 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b). 
50 Id. § 7412(d); § 7412(g)(2)(A). This is sometimes referred to as requiring the 
“maximum achievable control technology” (MACT). The two formulations are equivalent. 
51 Id. § 7412(d)(3). 
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sources.”52 This is the Clean Air Act’s version of “average of the best,” here 
again written directly into the statute.53 
 Notably, the statute does not require that the agency regulate only to 
the standard set by the average of the best-performing twelve percent. This is 
only a floor; the agency may regulate more stringently if it wishes.54 In 
practice, however, the EPA regularly sets its regulatory standards equal to the 
average of the best twelve percent. For instance, in 2004 the EPA issued a 
regulation limiting hazardous air pollutant emissions from boilers and 
process heaters.55 These types of heaters emit a range of hazardous chemicals, 
including arsenic and chromium.56 First, EPA divided the boilers into 18 
categories and classified the hazardous air pollutants into four types, for a 
total of 18 × 4 = 72 boiler-pollutant subcategories to be regulated.57 In 
accordance with the statute, the EPA then determined the “average of the 
best” polluters for these seventy-two subcategories. For 25 of them, the 
agency set emissions standards.58 For the other 47, the agency refused to 
impose any sort of emissions limitation whatsoever, because “the best-
performing sources were not achieving emissions reductions through the use 
of an emission control system.”59 That is, even the “best-performing” sources 
were doing nothing to reduce their emissions.60 
The EPA then announced that it would not impose more stringent 
regulation than that dictated by the “average of the best.” The agency 
explained: 
 
As documented in the memorandum “Methodology for Estimating 
Costs and Emissions Impacts for Industrial, Commercial, and 
Institutional Boilers and Process Heaters National Emission 
                                                 
52 Id. § 7412(d)(3)(A). 
53 Section 112 of the Clean Air Act was passed as part of the Clean Air Act Amendments 
of 1990. P.L. 101-549 (1990). By the time this section was enacted into law, the EPA had 
been using the “average of the best” standard (and the “best-performing” standard) for 
decades. This provided Congress with a model for how to draft the new statute. 
54 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(3)(A) (“shall not be less stringent, and may be more stringent 
than”). 
55 EPA, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Industrial, 
Commercial, and Institutional Boilers and Process Heaters, 69 Fed. Reg. 55,218 (2004). A 
process heater is a type of heater used to heat liquids, and it is often used for food or chemical 
processing, hence the name. 
56 Id. at 55,218. 
57 Id. at 55,222-24; Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 489 F.3d 1250, 1254-
55 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
58 Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 489 F.3d at 1254-55. 
59 EPA, National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants, 69 Fed. Reg. at 
55,233. 
60 Natural Resources Defense Council, 489 F.3d at 1254-55. 
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Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants” in the docket, EPA did 
consider the cost and emission impacts of a variety of regulatory 
options more stringent than the MACT floor for each subcategory. 
The EPA recognizes that for some subcategories, more stringent 
controls than the MACT floor can be applied and achieve additional 
emissions reductions. However, EPA also determined that the cost 
impacts of such controls were very high. Considering both the costs 
and emissions reductions, EPA determined that it would be infeasible 
to require any options more stringent than the floor level.61  
 
The document referenced in the EPA’s explanation does indeed include cost 
estimates for two more stringent regulatory options.62 However, it does not 
include any comparison between the costs of these regulatory options and the 
benefits they would be expected to produce.63 For that, one must turn to the 
EPA’s own Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA). The RIA includes 
calculations of the costs and benefits of the regulation the EPA eventually 
chose, plus one of the more stringent alternatives described in the 
“Methodology” document.64 Under both the rule the agency selected and the 
one alternative it analyzed, the net benefits of the regulation are significant—
on the order of $15 billion, depending on the discount rate chosen.65 At the 
same time, the EPA concluded that the more stringent regulation would 
produce slightly lower net benefits than the laxer regulation it selected.66 
It is thus possible that the EPA was justified in regulating only to the 
level of the “average of the best,” which meant leaving 45 heater/pollutant 
subcategories unregulated. However, the agency did not analyze the other 
more stringent regulatory option described in the “Methodology” document, 
much less a comprehensive set of alternatives.67 By confining itself to an 
examination of existing practices, rather than engaging in a full-fledged cost-
benefit analysis, the agency committed itself to norming. 
                                                 
61 Id. at 55,237. 
62 Jim Eddinger, Eastern Research Group, Methodology for Estimating Costs and 
Emissions Impacts for Industrial, Commercial, and Institutional Boilers and Process Heaters 
National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants 9-14 (Tables 3-2 and 3-3), 
https://yosemite1.epa.gov/ee/epa/ria.nsf/vwAN/A.2002.19-C.pdf/$file/A.2002.19-C.pdf. 
63 Id. 
64 EPA, Regulatory Impact Analysis for the Industrial Boilers and Process Heaters 
NESHAP 10-2 (Table 10-1), 
https://www3.epa.gov/ttnecas1/regdata/RIAs/indboilprocheatfinalruleRIA.pdf. 
65 Id. at 10-51. 
66 Id. The agency found that net benefits would drop by $160 million, or approximately 
1% of the total, if it adopted the more stringent regulation. 
67 Id. at 10-2. 
17 
 
Many other parts of the Clean Air Act similarly speak in the language 
of norming, even though they do not require it so explicitly as Section 112. 
Above, we cited a section of the Clean Air Act that calls for the agency to 
regulate to the extent “appropriate and necessary.” As we noted, this 
ambiguous language does not offer the agency much guidance and does not 
appear to contemplate norming. But other parts of the law are clearer. One 
section instructs the EPA to mandate the “best system of emission reduction 
. . . adequately demonstrated,”68 another requires the “best available control 
technology”69 (much like the Clean Water Act), and a third mandates 
“reasonably available control technology.”70 
 All of these statutory formulations within the Clean Water Act and 
Clean Air Act direct the EPA to norm. They instruct the EPA to select a level 
of regulation based upon “available” or “achievable” technology, presumably 
already in use by some regulated parties, and mandate that technology across 
the board. While different statutory sections of the Clean Water Act and 
Clean Air Act call for regulation at varying levels of stringency, they simply 
represent different levels of norming. For instance, the EPA norms differently 
when regulates under the “best available technology” standard in the Clean 
Water Act and when it regulates under the “best practicable technology” 
standard.71 While the location of the “norm” may be different, the underlying 
norming methodology is the same. 
 
B. Workplace Safety 
 
 The Occupational Safety and Health Act authorizes the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) to promulgate regulations 
regarding workplace safety. OSHA must impose the regulation “which most 
adequately assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best available 
evidence, that no employee will suffer material impairment of health or 
functional capacity.”72 This statutory language gave rise to so-called 
“feasibility analysis,” which we criticized in an earlier article.73 Under 
feasibility analysis, the agency imposes the strictest possible regulation that 
will not lead to mass layoffs or bankrupt significant numbers of firms within 
the regulated industry.74  
                                                 
68 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1) 
69 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4) 
70 42 U.S.C. § 7502(c)(1) 
71 See Entergy v. Riverkeeper, 556 U.S. at 211. 
72 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5). 
73 Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Against Feasibility Analysis, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 
657 (2010).  
74 Id. 
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Feasibility analysis involves a kind of norming. In broad strokes, the 
feasibility approach directs OSHA to avoid imposing substantial regulatory 
costs on an industry. One obvious means of accomplishing this is to set 
regulatory standards that many firms within the industry already meet, thus 
imposing no additional costs on those firms. Indeed, this is precisely how 
OSHA often regulates. We offer two examples. 
The first comes from a major OSHA rule on workplace air 
contaminants.75 In this regulation, OSHA identified hundreds of hazardous 
chemicals to which employees are exposed in the workplace. In preparation 
for the regulation, OSHA surveyed over 1.1 million workplaces.76 It found 
that over 500,000 workplaces used one of the chemicals being regulated. But 
of those 500,000 workplaces, only 131,005 (or roughly 26%) “would incur 
some costs to comply with the new limits.”77 That is, nearly 75% of all 
workplaces that used one of the chemicals at issue were already in 
compliance with the regulation.  
 OSHA’s relatively weak regulations were the result of a deliberate 
choice. In setting these standards, OSHA did not engage in “true” feasibility 
analysis, in the sense of determining how stringently it could regulate without 
causing mass layoffs or significant bankruptcies. Instead, it relied on 
standards that had been proposed by the American Conference of 
Governmental and Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH).78 ACGIH standards are 
well known in the field for being relatively lax, in part because the ACGIH 
largely relies upon industry surveys and data when setting them.79 In fact, 
                                                 
75 Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Air Contaminants, 54 Fed. Reg. 2332 
(1989).  
76 Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 54 Fed. Reg. at 2728. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 2724-25; Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas O. McGarity, Not So Paradoxical: The 
Rationale for Technology-Based Regulation, 1991 DUKE L.J. 729, 737-38 (1991). 
79 Barry I. Castleman & Grace E. Ziem, Corporate Influence On Threshold Limit Values, 
13 AM. J. INDUS. MED. 531, 537 (1988) (finding that many of the ACGIH standards were 
promulgated with reference to “unpublished corporate studies”); James C. Robinson, Dalton 
G. Paxman & Stephen M. Rappaport, Implications of OSHA’s Reliance on TLVs in 
Developing the Air Contaminants Standard, 19 AM. J. INDUS. MED. 3, 10-11 (1991) 
(criticizing the ACGIH standards for excessive reliance on industry reporting and 
inconsistency with the scientific literature); Shapiro & McGarity, supra note 76, at 738 n. 57 
(“ACGIH ignores published scientific material and relies more heavily on industry-supplied 
data”). In fact, OSHA’s regulation was even laxer than the ACGIH guidelines would have 
dictated: “OSHA failed to designate 67 substances covered by the rulemaking as 
carcinogens, and excluded an additional 68 substances from the ruling altogether, despite the 
cancer designations from NIOSH, ACGIH, NTP, EPA, and IARC.” Dalton G. Paxman & 
James C. Robinson, Regulation of Occupational Carcinogens under OSHA’s Air 
Contaminants Standard, 12 REGULATORY TOXICOLOGY & PHARMACOLOGY 296, 302 
(1990). This critique of OSHA’s Airborne Contaminants rule is trenchantly made in Shapiro 
& McGarity, supra note 76, at 736-38. 
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there was evidence that the ACGIH was itself engaged in norming, and that 
it had arrived at these standards precisely because they were already in 
widespread use throughout the industry. As the chairman of the ACGIH 
committee charged with devising the standards explained, the standards 
“have been based on a decade or two of industrial experience . . . . Clearly, 
such procedures can yield indisputable data on which realistic [standards] can 
be derived . . . .”80 Another former chairman of the same committee even 
alleged directly that the committee had been overly influenced by the 
regulated industry and charged industry consultants with engaging in 
“chicanery.”81 In the words of one pair of commentators, “Our conclusion is 
that [the ACGIH standards] for chemical substances are a compromise 
between health-based considerations and strictly practical industrial 
considerations, with the balance seeming to strongly favor the latter.”82 It is 
little wonder that so few firms were required to expend resources to comply 
with the new OSHA standards. 
 OSHA never explicitly states that it was engaged in norming. It is 
possible that it was unaware of the ACGIH’s reliance on norming, that it 
arrived at these standards after some other type of analysis, and that the 
resemblance to norming is mere coincidence. Yet it seems reasonable to infer 
that the agency chose this standard precisely because it had already been so 
widely adopted. OSHA was surely aware that the ACGIH standards had 
already been widely adopted, and it must have known of ACGIH’s reputation 
for adopting standards congenial to industry. The standard is also lax—too 
lax, according to most experts.83 The only thing to recommend the ACGIH 
standards is the fact that they had already been widely adopted. It looks very 
much as if OSHA was just norming to the 25th percentile.  
 Our second example is a 1991 OSHA rule regulating risks related to 
bloodborne pathogens such as hepatitis B and HIV.84 The purpose of the 
regulation was to mandate consistent and reliable safety practices for 
workplaces, such as dentists’ or doctors’ offices, where workers might come 
into contact with blood.85 OSHA, however, did not create the safety standards 
out of whole cloth. Rather, the regulations mirrored a set of guidelines that 
the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) had released years earlier.86 By the 
                                                 
80 S.A. Roach & S.M. Rappaport, But They Are Not Thresholds: A Critical Analysis of 
the Documentation of Threshold Limit Values, 17 AM. J. INDUS. MED. 727, 741 (1990). 
81 Id. 
82 S.A. Roach & S.M. Rappaport, But They Are Not Thresholds: A Critical Analysis of 
the Documentation of Threshold Limit Values, 17 AM. J. INDUS. MED. 727, 741 (1990). 
83 See sources cited in supra note 78. 
84 Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Occupational 
Exposure to Bloodborne Pathogens, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,004 (1991). 
85 Id. at 64,006-08. 
86 American Dental Ass’n v. Martin, 984 F.2d 823, 824 (1993). 
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time OSHA got around to promulgating the regulation, most businesses had 
already implemented their own safety rules based upon the CDC’s regulation 
and were already in compliance with the rule or close to it. Here is how 
OSHA described the status quo ante: 
 
Since the requirements of the standard closely follow the guidelines 
issued by the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) on universal 
precautions (UP), efforts by many organizations to adhere to the 
guidelines have created a solid base of practices and technology for 
the supplemental implementation of the standard. Based on recent 
surveys conducted by the Agency and other information available in 
the rulemaking docket, OSHA produced quantitative estimates of the 
compliance baseline, or extent of current compliance. OSHA found 
that most establishments have already implemented measures to 
protect workers from occupational exposure to blood and other 
potentially infectious materials, and that many are very close to full 
compliance with this standard.87 
 
Sure enough, after surveying the regulated population, OSHA found that pre-
regulatory rates of compliance ranged as high as 85 to 90 percent for certain 
industries and certain requirements.88  
 It may seem odd or indefensible to criticize an agency for adopting 
CDC guidelines in its regulation. After all, the CDC is presumably expert in 
this area, and it may well have selected the optimal level of precautions when 
formulating its guidelines. However, here that turned out not to be the case. 
OSHA’s regulations proved to be inadequate, particularly with respect to 
injuries from handling dirty needles. In response, nine years later Congress 
passed a new law, the Needlestick Safety and Prevention Act, mandating a 
new round of bloodborne pathogen regulation.89 OSHA promulgated new 
guidelines, and those remain in effect today.90 
 As with OSHA’s air contaminant regulation, the agency never states 
directly that it is engaged in norming.91 But we can infer that OSHA likely 
adopted these standards because they were already in such widespread use. 
OSHA’s industry survey predated its regulatory decision. When it 
promulgated the regulation, it was aware that a high percentage of firms were 
                                                 
87 Department of Labor, Occupational Exposure to Bloodborne Pathogens, 56 Fed. Reg. 
at 64,039. 
88 Id. at 64,060-63. 
89 Pub. L. 106-430 (2000). 
90 U.S. Department of Labor, Quick Reference Guide to the Bloodborne Pathogens 
Standard, https://www.osha.gov/SLTC/bloodbornepathogens/bloodborne_quickref.html 
91 Neither does the CDC, which did not have the same reputation as the ACGIH for 
adopting standards dictated by industry. 
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already in compliance. It is also unlikely that OSHA arrived at these 
standards through any other type of decision procedure. The standards are 
substantially weaker than what either cost-benefit analysis or feasibility 
analysis would have dictated.92 Indeed, they were viewed as so insufficient 
that Congress passed new legislation to mandate stricter standards less than 
a decade later. Accordingly, even without any explicit indication, it is likely 
that OSHA’s bloodborne pathogen regulations were the result of norming. 
  
C. Financial Regulation 
 
 Banks are heavily regulated because they impose risks on the 
economy. The harmful externality arises from two sources. First, because 
banks play a central role in the financial system, and because banks are linked 
together through financial transactions, the collapse of one bank can cause 
the collapse of the entire financial system, resulting in a sudden withdrawal 
of credit from the economy. Because businesses depend on credit, bank 
collapse can in turn cause business collapse. Second, because the government 
supplies insurance to the banking system—to minimize the risk of a financial 
crisis—banks externalize some of the risks they take on the government and 
hence the taxpayer. To deter excessive risky financial activities, the 
government regulates banks.93 
 Much of the risk caused by the banking system comes from banks’ 
reliance on demand deposits for the bulk of their capital needs. As a result, 
banks are highly leveraged. High leverage leads to high returns for 
shareholders, but also high risk, which is externalized on taxpayers. To 
counter this risk, regulators impose capital requirements. These regulations 
require banks to raise a certain portion of their capital from equity. The capital 
requirement designates that portion—which has varied from about 5 to 8% 
over the years. For example (and simplifying greatly), if a bank owns assets 
worth $100, and the capital requirement is 5%, then it can be funded with no 
more than $95 of debt. The other $5 must take the form of equity. 
 Banks, like other businesses, do not necessarily maximize their profits 
by relying as much as possible on debt. There are business reasons—related 
to tax, corporate governance, and other considerations—that cause business 
                                                 
92 Recall that under feasibility analysis, OSHA is expected to regulate to the greatest 
extent possible without causing mass layoffs or widespread firm bankruptcies. Masur & 
Posner, Against Feasibility Analysis, supra note 73. Here, fewer than half of the affected 
firms needed to take any action at all, much less lay off even a single employee. Department 
of Labor, Occupational Exposure to Bloodborne Pathogens, 56 Fed. Reg. at 64,060. 
93 See ANAT R. ADMATI & MARTIN HELLWIG, THE BANKERS’ NEW CLOTHES: WHAT’S 
WRONG WITH BANKING AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 108 (2013); Allen N. Berger & Christa 
H.S. Bouwman, How Does Capital Affect Bank Performance During Financial Crises?, 109 
J. FIN. ECON. 146, 149-150 (2013). 
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to choose varying mixes of debt and equity. Many banks maintain relatively 
high capital ratios. However, the risk externality and government insurance 
cause banks at the margin to substitute debt for equity. 
 Congress has required regulators to set capital requirements, but 
provided little guidance.94 Regulators thus have had considerable discretion 
in choosing the stringency of capital requirements. In earlier work, one of us 
shows that rather than determine capital requirements using cost-benefit 
analysis, regulators have engaged in norming.95 They have chosen capital 
requirements that were typically below the capital ratios that prevailed in the 
vast majority of banks. The effect was to burden only the least capitalized 
banks, the outliers on the distribution of capital ratios. Notably, the financial 
agencies justified the capital requirements they chose based on just this 
point—that the requirements would burden only a small number of banks. 
 One of many examples comes from the mid-1980s. In 1983, Congress 
passed the International Lending Supervision Act, which required the bank 
regulators to “achieve and maintain adequate capital by establishing 
minimum levels of capital” for the banking system.96 The language provides 
no guidance whatsoever but because the statute was passed in response to an 
earlier banking crisis, the agencies understood that they were supposed to 
raise capital levels. In 1985 the bank regulators raised capital requirements to 
5.5% for primary capital and 6% for total capital.  
 None of the three major regulators explained why they set capital 
requirements at these new levels. What they did say was that that the new 
levels would affect relatively few banks. The Comptroller of the Currency, 
which regulates national banks, said: 
 
[A]pproximately 95% of all national banks had a primary capital ratio 
in excess of 6%, a level which would exceed the primary capital 
requirement established by this regulation. In addition, most of the 
larger multinational and regional banks (which generally have lower 
capital ratios than smaller banks) had primary and total capital ratios 
which would exceed the minimum requirements.97 
 
In other words, the regulation would affect only a small percentage of 
banks—5% of them. This is a classic example of norming. 
                                                 
94 Eric A. Posner, How Do Bank Regulators Determine Capital-Adequacy 
Requirements?, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1853 (2015). 
95 Id.  
96 ILSA § 908(a)(1), 97 Stat at 1280, codified as amended at 12 USC § 3907(a)(1). 
97 Comptroller of the Currency, Minimum Capital Ratios: Issuance of Directives, 50 
Fed. Reg. 10,207, 10,208 (1985). 
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 There is good reason to believe that the regulations were far from 
adequate. Most economists believe that capital requirements should be much 
higher.98 Decades later, after the financial crisis, regulators finally jacked up 
capital regulations to a respectable level. Norming may have been tempting 
in earlier years because it allowed bank regulators to impose restrictions on 
the worse banks without stirring resistance from the entire industry. But with 
the benefit of hindsight, we can see that this approach was a serious mistake. 
 
D. Automobile Safety 
 
The regulation of automobile safety by the Department of 
Transportation (DOT) has been, from its inception, an exercise in norming. 
In 1966, Congress passed the Motor Vehicle Safety Act, which delegated 
authority to the DOT to promulgate safety regulations.99 The law directed the 
Secretary of Transportation to “establish by order appropriate Federal motor 
vehicle safety standards. Each such Federal motor vehicle safety standard 
shall be practicable, shall meet the need for motor vehicle safety, and shall be 
stated in objective terms.”100 The law then specified that the DOT should 
immediately engage in at least two rounds of regulation. For the first round 
of regulation, the law required the DOT to “issue initial Federal motor vehicle 
safety standards based upon existing safety standards.”101 That is, Congress 
explicitly instructed the agency to set its initial regulatory standards 
according to what firms in the industry were already doing. For the second 
round, the law merely directed the agency to issue “new and revised” safety 
standards.102 The Motor Vehicle Safety Act thus resembles Section 112 of 
the Clean Air Act, in that norming is explicitly written into the language of 
the statute. 
In 1970, the National Commission on Product Safety commissioned 
an outside report by a group of lawyers and law professors to evaluate the 
DOT’s progress in regulating auto safety.103 The report examined the 
agency’s first 34 regulations and found that 29 of the 34 were either “not 
significant” or had “minor significance” in altering the ways in which 
automobiles were designed and built.104 The report concluded: 
                                                 
98 ADMATI & HELLWIG, supra note 93, at 104 (2013). 
99 Motor Vehicle Safety Act, P.L. 89-563, 8 Stat. 718 (1966). 
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[T]he best that may be said for the safety standards issued thus far is 
that they incorporate some of the best of current practice in the 
automobile industry. Almost every performance requirement was 
derived from industry development and practice. Industry has led and 
Government has followed. The agency has chosen from among 
industry’s best practices those suitable for issuance as performance 
requirements. If this pattern continues, progress in the issuance of 
safety standards could move no faster than industry’s progress in 
developing and putting into practice particular safety advances.105 
 
This remained the case even after the agency was no longer required to 
promulgate regulations “based upon existing safety standards.”106 As one 
study put it, “As a practical matter, however, the ‘existing standards’ 
requirement of the statute far outlived the initial rules. The point is well 
illustrated by the second generation of safety standards . . . . These thirteen 
rules were no more innovative than the first generation had been.”107 
Decades later, the DOT—and its subunit, the National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)—now regulate under new authority 
from new statutes that do not require norming so explicitly. Nonetheless, the 
agency still regularly engages in regulatory norming, though not to the same 
degree as in the late 1960s. Consider, for example, a 2011 NHTSA rule meant 
to protect automobile occupants from being thrown from their cars during 
accidents.108 In 2005, Congress passed a law aimed at preventing deaths from 
accidents in which automobiles flipped or rolled over, sometimes referred to 
as “rollover crashes.”109 That law directed the DOT to “initiate rulemaking 
proceedings, for the purpose of establishing rules or standards that will reduce 
vehicle rollover crashes and mitigate deaths and injuries associated with such 
crashes,”110 and (like the Motor Vehicle Safety Act) required that those 
standards be “practicable.”111 
Rollover accidents can become particularly deadly if automobile 
passengers and drivers who are not wearing seatbelts are thrown from the 
                                                 
105 Id. at 60. See also Mashaw & Harfst, supra note 4 at 70 (“It was also becoming clear 
that public regulation had been largely ineffectual in forcing automotive technology.”). 
106 Motor Vehicle Safety Act § 103(h). 
107 Mashaw & Harfst, supra note 4 at 78. 
108 U.S. Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, Ejection Mitigation; Phase-In Reporting 
Requirements; Incorporation by Reference, 76 Fed. Reg. 3212 (2011). 
109 Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for 
Users, Pub. Law 109-59 (2005). 
110 49 U.S.C. § 30128. 
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vehicle through a window. NHTSA thus set out to promulgate regulations 
that would keep automobile occupants inside of their vehicles even if they 
did not wear seatbelts. There were two potential technologies: side curtain 
airbags, which would deploy in the event of a crash and hold occupants inside 
the automobile; and advanced lamination techniques for automobile glass 
(“advanced glazing,” in industry parlance) that would prevent window glass 
from shattering on impact.112 These two technologies are complementary, 
and the agency could have mandated both.113 Nonetheless, it opted to require 
only the former—the installation of side curtain airbags.114 
Although the agency does not admit as much, norming appears to be 
a significant part of the reason that it elected to require only airbags and not 
advanced glazing as well. By the agency’s calculation, 55% of Model Year 
2011 automobiles were already equipped with side curtain airbags that would 
trigger in the event of a rollover accident.115 Even some much older 
automobiles met the regulatory standards, including the 2004 Honda 
Accord116 and the 2003 Toyota Camry.117 Model Year 2011 automobiles 
typically arrive on the market in Fall 2010, and the regulation was not set to 
take effect until September 2014, around the time that Model Year 2015 
automobiles would be released.118 Accordingly, it is likely that by September 
2014, many more than 55% of automobiles would have included the 
appropriate type of airbag.119 By contrast, advanced glazing was far less 
common within the industry. 
 The comments that the DOT received are instructive. Automobile 
manufacturers and their trade groups—including the Alliance of Automobile 
Manufacturers, the Association of International Automobile Manufacturers, 
and firms such as Ford and General Motors—were “generally supportive of 
                                                 
112 DOT, 76 Fed. Reg. at 3213-15. 
113 NHTSA, Office of Regulatory Analysis and Evaluation, National Center for Statistics 
and Analysis, Final Regulatory Impact Analysis, FMVSS No. 226 Ejection Mitigation 135 
n. 164 (2011). 
114 Id. at 3212. To be precise, the agency set a safety standard—based upon what would 
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115 NHTSA, supra note 109, at 46. 
116 Id. at 136. 
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119 The agency did note that as few as 53% of the currently deployed airbags would be 
fully effective per the terms of the regulation. Accordingly, only 55% × 53% = 29% of 
existing automobiles would require no modifications to become compliant with the 
regulation. Id. at 112-13. Nonetheless, the other 26% of automobiles with curtain airbags 
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them compliant. 
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many aspects” of the new rule.120 The manufacturers complained that the 
regulations were somewhat too stringent, which is to be expected; if the 
regulation had been weaker, even more than 55% of existing automobiles 
would already have been in compliance.121 But they generally favored the 
agency’s decision to require only airbags and not advanced glazing as well. 
Some comments were explicit on this point: “Ford commented that side 
glazing retention in real-world rollover crashes is random and unpredictable 
and expressed the belief that FMVSS No. 226 should be focused on rollover-
activated side curtain technology.”122 
 The regulation easily passed a cost-benefit analysis: the DOT 
projected approximately $2.3 billion in benefits (based upon preventing 373 
fatalities and 476 serious injuries per year) against only $507 million in 
costs.123 This is not surprising. Norming will often lead to regulations that 
pass cost-benefit tests, precisely because lagging firms are only being asked 
to install technology that leading firms have already validated. The question 
is whether the DOT could have generated even greater net benefits by 
requiring advanced glazing in addition to side curtain airbags. Here, the 
evidence is less certain; the agency did not offer a precise estimate of the 
costs and benefits of advanced glazing.124 But the agency’s imprecise 
calculations suggest that mandating advanced glazing in addition to curtain 
airbags plausibly could have increased the regulation’s net benefits.125 
In sum, the DOT selected a regulatory standard that was weaker than 
CBA would recommend and had already been adopted by more than half of 
the industry (and was therefore supported by the industry). This suggests that 
the agency was engaged in norming, and that reliance on norming, as opposed 
to some other type of decision procedure, may have led the agency to 
promulgate a suboptimal regulation.  
 
III. NORMING: COSTS AND BENEFITS 
 
A. The Case for Norming 
                                                 
120 DOT, 76 Fed. Reg. at 3220. 
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 While we are skeptical that norming is a proper method for agency 
regulation, we begin by sketching out a possible defense of it. To fix 
intuitions, imagine an industry that consists of a large number of firms. The 
firms sell to consumers who are mostly different from residents who live 
nearby their production facilities; only the residents are harmed when the 
firms pollute. Assume that the firms are identical in all respects except two. 
First, every firm emits a different amount of pollution into the atmosphere in 
the course of manufacturing consumer goods. We can imagine the firms 
arrayed along a horizontal line, from the least-polluting firms to the most-
polluting firms, with most of the firms clustered in the middle around the 
mean level of emissions. Assume that the firms differ with respect to the 
quality, sophistication, and hence expense of the pollution-control 
technology they use; the firms that have invested more in that technology 
emit less pollution. Second, every firm charges a price for its products that is 
inversely related to the amount of pollution that it emits. The most-polluting 
firm charges the lowest price; the lease-polluting firm charges the highest 
price; and so on. Accordingly, we assume that the cost savings that a firm 
enjoys when it avoids reducing emissions are passed on to the consumer in 
the form of lower prices. 
 Before we analyze regulatory approaches, we should address an 
obvious question, which is how such variation is possible in the first place. 
In a perfectly competitive market, consumers would buy from the most-
polluting firms because they offer the lowest prices and the consumers are 
not affected by the pollution; the other firms would go out of business. But 
in a more realistic setting, variation is not surprising. If the price differences 
are small, consumers might not be influenced by them, and prefer instead to 
buy from trusted brands or convenient outlets. Some firms might enjoy 
market power because of their location or other advantages. The firms might 
vary because they have installed pollution-control technologies at different 
times, have gambled with technologies that turned out to perform better than 
or worse than average, or are managed differently. Variation in state tort law 
and regulation may also account for differences in the firms’ pollution-
control technologies. 
 Let us first consider how a regulator would approach this industry if 
it uses cost-benefit analysis. The regulator would ask whether the higher-
quality pollution control equipment generates benefits greater than the costs. 
The benefits accrue to nearby residents who inhale the pollution, while the 
costs are borne by consumers who buy the products. Notably, the regulator 
would not pay attention to the variation among firms with respect to the 
pollution control technology that they use and the amount of pollution they 
emit. The cost-benefit analysis could reveal that even the least-polluting firm 
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pollutes too much—the harms to residents exceed the benefits to consumers. 
If so, the regulator would issue a regulation that burdens all the firms, 
requiring all of them to install more technology and reduce emissions to a 
level below the best-performing firm. Alternatively, the cost-benefit analysis 
could also reveal that none of the firms should be regulated—even the worst-
performing firm produces benefits greater than the costs. Any other level of 
regulatory stringency is also possible. 
 By contrast, an agency that followed the norming approach would use 
the distribution itself to set the level of strictness mandated by the regulation. 
For example, this could involve requiring all firms to use the quality of 
pollution-control technology (or emit pollution) at a level at least as good as 
that of the median firm. Of course, one could imagine other approaches 
roughly consistent with the idea of norming. The regulator might choose a 
level of stringency that affects only the bottom X% of firms—where X could 
be 5, 10, 75, or any other number.126 The idea of norming does not tell us how 
much of the tail of the distribution is targeted; only that the regulator takes 
the distribution as given and targets some portion of the tail. 
 Under what conditions could norming be superior to cost-benefit 
analysis? The major challenge of cost-benefit analysis is estimating 
valuations. The regulator must value both the benefits of a regulation (in our 
example, health benefits, including saved medical costs) and the costs (in our 
example, the cost of pollution-control technology). Both types of valuation 
can be difficult. Many benefits of regulation are hard to monetize—including 
avoided mortality risk, intangible health benefits like fewer headaches, and 
enhancement of natural beauty. The cost of regulation also can be hard to 
estimate because technology can change rapidly, causing compliance costs to 
fall. When an agency engages in norming, it avoids having to estimate costs 
and benefits, which also means it avoids the risk that calculation errors will 
cause it to issue a regulation that is too strong or too weak. 
 Still, norming can be superior to cost-benefit analysis only if there is 
reason to believe that the firm above the regulatory threshold is emitting the 
optimal amount of pollution, or at least that it is closer to the optimum than a 
regulator using cost-benefit analysis could get. But why would firms 
voluntarily incur costs to reduce pollution below the profit-maximizing level? 
There would need to be a source of constraint on pollution independent of 
federal regulation. We can imagine such constraint arising from several 
sources. 
 First, the variation could come from state law. Imagine that in most 
(but not all) states, an optimal (or at least very good) tort or regulatory regime 
prevails. If most firms are in the states with the optimal tort regime, then most 
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firms will issue the optimal amount of pollution. The firms that issue an 
excessive amount of pollution are located in the states with suboptimal tort 
law. A federal regulation that required all firms to use the pollution control 
technology of the median firm (or to emit no more pollution than the median 
firm) would eliminate the inefficient outliers in the spirit of norming. Here, 
the national regulator may lack the information needed to conduct cost-
benefit analysis but can piggyback off the independent efforts of state courts 
and regulators around the country.127 
 Second, the variation could come from market structure. Imagine a 
form of market segmentation in which most firms offer reasonable-quality 
products to most consumers while a few firms offer low-quality products to 
unsophisticated consumers. Such segmentation occurs in many industries. 
For example, in credit markets banks tend to offer higher-quality products—
lower-risk loans that are adequately explained—than do some mortgage 
brokers, payday lenders, and other bottom feeders, which offer complex and 
risky products that lure unsophisticated borrowers. A regulator could believe 
that by mandating the terms and product features of the best firms, it will 
drive out of business the firms that pose unreasonable risks to consumers. 
 Third, the variation could come from management choices made 
under different levels of information, and reflecting different risk preferences 
among managers and investors. Imagine, for example, that entrepreneurs set 
up exchanges or clearinghouses in order to act as intermediaries among 
various sophisticated market agents. The entrepreneurs must choose various 
features of their business, for example, the magnitude of margin 
requirements. In making this choice, the entrepreneur must balance the costs 
and benefits of its customers. Different entrepreneurs make different 
judgments, resulting in variation across institutions. A regulator who thinks 
that uniformity is desirable might reasonably believe that the median balance 
is optimal, and accordingly mandate it by regulation.128 
 In many cases, we observe private associations choosing to mandate 
standards among their members. When they do so, they typically observe a 
variation of actions, and choose a standard somewhere in the middle. This is 
familiar from ethical codes of conduct among lawyers, accounting standards, 
medical standards, and so on. In these cases, the regulator may believe that 
the association chooses a standard that protects the reputation of the industry, 
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and endorse it through regulation because the association is in a better 
position to assess benefits and costs than the regulator is. The regulator thus 
converts the industry standard into a licensing requirement or other 
independent source of law. 
 Generalizing from these examples, we conclude that norming may be 
superior to cost-benefit analysis when (1) estimating costs and benefits is 
extremely hard for the government; and (2) the industry in question either 
does not create negative externalities (in the area in which the regulator 
regulates) or is forced to internalize them by other sources of law, 
considerations of reputation, and so on. When these conditions are met, the 
argument for norming boils down to a claim that the large number of firms 
that cluster around the median are more likely to have made a correct 
judgment than the small number of outliers. The regulator thus uses the 
pattern of behavior of the firms as a source of information that is more easily 
obtainable than the information needed to estimate the costs and benefits of 
particular technologies. 
  
B. The Problems with Norming 
 
 While the case for norming may be sound on theoretical grounds, we 
are skeptical that the empirical conditions for norming prevail in many 
markets. We are also concerned that norming may cause independent 
problems, such as cartelization, and may be susceptible to political misuse. 
We leave political misuse for Section C and address the other issues here. 
 
 Costs and benefits. The case for norming rests on the difficulty of 
estimating costs and benefits. While in some quarters commentators remain 
skeptical about cost-benefit analysis,129 this decision procedure has become 
routine in government because of its many advantages. The quantification 
problem arises for many reasons: some benefits (e.g., longevity, natural 
beauty) are hard to measure; so are some costs, because of the speed with 
which technology changes; and it is often difficult to trace out chains of 
causation from regulation to business behavior. Yet these problems are 
ubiquitous in ordinary life—for businesses as much as for regulators—and 
quantification remains the standard procedure. When uncertainty exists, one 
makes rough rather than precise estimates; and when uncertainty is high 
enough, the normal solution is not to adopt some other procedure for 
regulation but not to regulate in the first place. Regulators, like businesses, 
can reduce uncertainty by investing in research. 
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 If businesses use cost-benefit analysis (normally, called net present 
value analysis) to evaluate projects, then regulators can, too. Agencies can 
also put in place institutional procedures that allow them to revisit cost-
benefit analyses that rely on uncertain estimates, and revise them as 
necessary, in this way learning from experience.130 
 
 Externalities; market regulation. Our second basis for skepticism is 
that most regulation is necessary because of the problem of externalities, and 
norming is a particularly unwise approach to regulating externalities. Take 
the paradigm case of pollution. Firms pollute in order to keep their costs 
down. Because the harm is borne by third parties, the firms do not face any 
penalty (except possibly a reputational penalty if the pollution is discovered) 
in the absence of a legal response. If the legal or regulatory response is itself 
based on the activity of the median firm, then the law will allow harmful 
levels of pollution rather than stopping it. While the norming regulator may 
shut down the worst polluters, it would do much better using cost-benefit 
analysis if the median or above-median firms also emit excessively high 
levels of pollution, as one would predict from normal market incentives. 
 In the previous section, we provided some scenarios in which state 
law or reputational sanctions prevent the worse kind of abuse, and so norming 
could be justified.131 But the scenarios do not seem likely to prevail in 
practice. A major reason for federal regulation is that state regulation is 
inadequate. Reputational sanctions are also typically weak. The best case for 
norming arises when the industry does not generate externalities, but since 
the major reason for regulation is to counter externalities, the best case will 
not arise very often. Exchanges and clearinghouses, for example, are 
regulated because of the negative external effects caused by financial crises, 
which the collapse of an exchange or clearinghouse could spark. If these 
institutions did not produce negative externalities, there would be little reason 
to regulate them in the first place. 
 
 Cartelization. Many economists believe that firms have used 
regulation to raise barriers to entry into their industry.132 A common 
interpretation of licensing requirements, for example, is that they mandate 
business practices that most firms in the industry already use, while forcing 
out marginal firms or excluding new entrants who can offer the same goods 
and services at lower prices if they are not required to engage in the median 
or normal practice. If the business practice is unnecessary and undesired by 
consumers, the effect of the regulation is to reduce competition, which 
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benefits incumbent firms while harming consumers. Because the “norming” 
approach does not involve direct evaluation of the benefits and costs of 
existing business practices, the regulator may end up mandating business 
practices that reduce competition. Indeed, as we argue in Section C, this may 
explain why norming seems to be a regulatory approach that businesses 
support. 
 
 Indeterminacy. As our case studies illustrated, norming is merely an 
umbrella term that covers a vast range of regulatory stringency. The standard 
does not itself tell the regulator whether to regulate at the 50th percentile, the 
1st percentile, or the 99th percentile. One can narrow down the approach by 
making certain assumptions. If, for example, the firms in the industry do not 
generate externalities on others, there is a theoretical reason for using the 50th 
percentile.133 But if the firms do generate externalities, a higher percentile 
should be used. The case studies also show another problem: how does the 
regulator identify the behavior that should be “normed”? For capital 
regulation, regulators initially relied upon simple capital ratios that relied 
only on the proportion of equity to assets. As it became clear that simple 
capital ratios did not accurately measure the risk level of banking because 
they ignore the riskiness of the underlying assets and liabilities, regulators 
moved to a more complicated system.134 In the environmental examples, it 
was never clear why the EPA chose one measure of pollution rather than 
another. We suspect that agencies resolved both of these issues by relying 
either on an informal cost-benefit test or succumbing to pressure from 
industry or other interest groups. 
 
C. The Political Appeal of Norming 
 
 This brings us to the biggest concern with norming: that it is an 
appealing way to regulate from a political rather than a social standpoint. 
Agencies may choose to norm rather than conduct cost-benefit analysis or 
another procedure because norming is easier, less vulnerable to judicial and 
public scrutiny, and less likely to provoke political opposition from industry. 
There are a number of reasons for this. 
 First, as we have observed, the major advantage of norming is that it 
puts a low burden on the resources of agency decision-makers. Rather than 
perform studies of the costs and benefits of various technologies, the 
regulator need only survey industry practice. While the limited resources of 
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regulators may justify the use of shortcuts from time to time, this particular 
shortcut is extreme. 
 Second, norming may be appealing because it shields regulations 
from judicial review. Because norming puts less of a burden on regulators 
than cost-benefit analysis does, regulators that use norming are also less 
likely to make identifiable errors that can be used against them when 
regulations are challenged in court. In the case of cost-benefit analysis, 
regulators can be (and have been) criticized for using inconsistent discount 
factors and valuations; ignoring relevant academic studies; underestimating 
costs and exaggerating benefits; and so on.135 Because there is an established 
methodology for performing cost-benefit analysis, industry can retain 
credible experts to identify these errors. While courts do not invariably strike 
down regulations that are based on cost-benefit analyses that contain errors—
in fact, rarely do—the litigation risk is real, and a significant preoccupation 
for agencies.136 
 By contrast, when an agency engages in norming, the only way for 
the regulator to err is to mischaracterize the distribution of industry practices, 
or to choose a threshold that is inconsistent with the statute or the arbitrary 
and capricious standard of the Administrative Procedure Act. There is 
nothing complicated about the first task. If, for example, the relevant variable 
is the expense of the safety equipment that has been installed in factors, or 
the amount of emissions, then the regulator will be able to rely on either 
publicly available data or data collected from the industry, and it is simply a 
matter of describing the distribution. 
 The choice of the regulatory threshold is more complicated. An 
agency could, in principle, set the threshold exactly at the mean, near the 
bottom of the tail, or nearly anywhere else on the distribution. The issue here 
is that since there is no technical way to do so—no established formula or 
procedure that provides a baseline against which errors could be identified—
it would be difficult for a challenger to explain to a court why the chosen 
regulatory threshold is improper.137 
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Mr. Vaez’s testimony [that the bank “ranked near the bottom of its peer group 
in all of the equity related ratios”] does not demonstrate a correlation between the 
Bank ranking towards the bottom of its peer in an analysis of equity related ratios 
and a finding that the Bank’s capital level was unsafe and unsound. Obviously, this 
peer group analysis indicates that a majority of banks, approximately the same size 
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 Third, because norming tends to result in low regulatory burdens for 
most of the regulated industry, industry opposition is likely to be muted, 
relative to more aggressive regulatory approaches like cost-benefit analysis. 
In the area of financial regulation, for example, it is well known that banks 
tend not to challenge regulations. While commentators have argued that 
banks refrain from challenging regulations because they fear retaliation from 
regulators,138 another reason might be that the banks believe that the 
regulations actually serve their interest or are weak enough to be tolerated. 
The automobile industry’s largely positive response to NHTSA’s side curtain 
airbag regulation offers a similar example.139 
 In sum, while norming may be justified under narrow conditions, 
agencies might use it more generally because it is easy to do and protects 
them from opposition and scrutiny. 
 
IV. NORMING ELSEWHERE IN THE LAW 
 
A. Constitutional Law 
 
 Many constitutional scholars believe that the Supreme Court engages 
in a procedure akin to norming. In many cases, when people challenge a law 
of a particular state, the Court surveys the relevant laws of all the states. If 
few or no other states have enacted such a law, the court might find in this 
pattern a “consensus” on certain constitutional values. The “outlier” state is 
ruled out of constitutional bounds, and its law is struck down. 
 This procedure is best known from Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. 
The Eighth Amendment bars criminal punishments that are “cruel and 
unusual.”140 The Court has ruled that these terms are to be understood in light 
of evolving norms, evidence of which is supplied by the practices of the states 
and even of foreign countries. For example, in Coker v. Georgia, the Court 
                                                 
as Bellaire Bank, maintain a higher level of equity than Bellaire Bank. This analysis 
may indicate that further investigation is needed. It does not, by itself, prove that 
the Bank's capital level was unsafe and unsound. It is very possible that all the banks 
in the peer group are maintaining a safe and sound capital level. Without a 
connection between the peer group analysis and a finding of unsafe and unsound 
capital levels, therefore, the peer group analysis does not support the Comptroller’s 
finding that the Bank's capital level was unsafe and unsound. 
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retaliation-stifles-banks-appeals-to-regulators 
139 See supra Part II.D. 
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struck down a law that imposed the death penalty on those convicted of raping 
an adult woman. After pointing that “at no time in the last 50 years have a 
majority of the States authorized death as a punishment for rape,” and 
pointing to other indications that most states disapprove of this practice, the 
Court ruled that the punishment is cruel and unusual, and hence 
unconstitutional.141 Following the same style of reasoning, the Court has 
struck downs laws that impose the death penalty on children and mentally 
retarded people who commit capital crimes.142 
 Some scholars have argued that, in Judge Easterbrook’s words, the 
Court “extirpates outliers” in many other areas of its jurisprudence, including 
equal protection and substantive due process.143 Consider the contraception 
ban struck down in Griswold144 or the sodomy law struck down in Lawrence 
v. Texas.145 In both of these cases, the Court ruled against a single state or 
small number of states whose laws deviated in significant measure from the 
laws of other states.146 It is possible to see this type of logic in the Court’s 
procedural due process and Second Amendment147 cases as well. The Court’s 
occasional reference to the laws of other countries fits this pattern as well. 
When deciding Eighth Amendment or due process cases, the Court 
sometimes surveys the laws of other countries—particularly developed 
democracies—to ascertain whether American law is an outlier. This is 
norming of a more stringent type, where the U.S. is normed to a high standard 
set by just a few countries. 
 This practice can be compared with other constitutional methods. 
Originalist scholars, for example, argue that a court should strike down 
statutes that violate the original understanding of the Constitution.148 It is 
irrelevant whether any, many, or most states have similar statutes. If certain 
gun control laws violate the Second Amendment, it is irrelevant whether most 
states have those gun control laws: they must all be struck down. Another 
standard view, according to which courts should protect minorities shut out 
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of the political process,149 also rejects the relevance of frequency of such 
statutes. If most or even all states have laws that discriminate against racial 
or sexual minorities, for example, those laws are still unconstitutional. It 
would make no sense for a court committed to protecting minorities to uphold 
those laws, or limit itself to striking down the most discriminatory statutes in 
the very worst states while upholding less discriminatory statutes in the 
remaining states. 
 The Court’s norming practice has been the topic of considerable 
debate, with a great deal of attention paid to whether the Court has applied 
the outlier-extirpation approach in a consistent and reasonable matter. On the 
merits of the procedure, most scholars seem skeptical. They argue that a 
consensus among the states does not necessarily reflect much about the views 
and constitutional values of the people, or even of the state legislatures. A 
few scholars have suggested that the Court’s approach could make sense. As 
Cass Sunstein puts it, “consensus may have epistemic value: if most people 
believe that X is true, X may well be true, certainly under favorable 
conditions.”150 If most states believe that executing mentally disabled people 
is cruel, then it may well be cruel. 
 As Sunstein’s comment suggests, the case for outlier-extirpation is 
informational, just as the case for norming is. The difference between the 
administrative and constitutional settings is that the regulators are mainly 
concerned with facts about the world—whether a type of pollution causes 
harms, for example—while in constitutional cases the focus is on moral or 
constitutional values.151 If such things as constitutional values exist, and if 
they are reflected in state legislation, then the Supreme Court may discover 
those values by observing the practices of states rather than relying on the 
possibly defective intuitions of the justices. The logic of information 
aggregation applies in both cases. 
 The Court’s jurisprudence shows the benefits and limits of norming. 
On the one hand, the Court’s use of norming seems understandable because 
in many cases it has no external standard for evaluating the laws of the states. 
To the extent that these laws reflect information—about facts or values—they 
can reasonably be used as a source to derive a national standard if such a 
standard is called for. On the other hand, the Court’s approach is vulnerable 
to the objections that we have seen. If state legislatures do not independently 
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reflect on the advisability of these laws before enacting them, or if states are 
not trying to arrive at socially optimal answers, the normative force of the 
pattern is questionable. 
 A major difference between agency practice and judicial practice is 
that the agencies are far more concerned with behavior that generates 
externalities. Where, as we have discussed, a business practice causes harms 
to third parties, the regulator should try to stop that practice or at least restrain 
it. While the firm at the center of the distribution causes less harm that the 
outlier, both firms should be regulated. In contrast, most of the Supreme 
Court cases we have discussed do not involve externalities in such a 
straightforward way. If Connecticut bans contraception, it does not harm 
people in Oklahoma or California. There are other areas of the law that 
restrict states from imposing externalities on each other—for example, the 
domestic commerce clause, which blocks states from imposing trade barriers 
on each other. Because the states externalize costs through trade barriers, the 
outlier-extirpation approach would be unwise and does not appear to be used 
by the Court, as one would expect. 
 
B. Incorporation of Custom in the Common Law 
 
 Another style of norming occurs in pockets of the common law where 
courts derive legal standards from the customary practices of firms. In tort 
law, for example, courts frequently use custom to determine the level of due 
care for the purpose of establishing whether a defendant acted negligently. 
Custom may supply evidence of due care, or even the standard itself.152 This 
is common in the area of medical malpractice, among many others, where 
doctors are held to the community standard rather than required to comply 
with an independent cost-benefit analysis. In contract law, courts sometimes 
use industry custom to fill in gaps or resolve ambiguities in contracts.153 
Incorporation of custom also sometimes occurs in statutory interpretation, 
especially when statutes are vague and subject to judicial elaboration over 
time. In intellectual property law, industry standards are used to determine 
the meaning of fair use and the point at which an invention becomes obvious, 
among other concepts.154 Examples in common and statutory law can be 
easily multiplied. 
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 Incorporation of custom can be contrasted to other methods for 
resolving common-law disputes. In tort law, a defendant’s behavior can be 
subject to a cost-benefit test, like the Hand formula. In The T.J. Hooper, 
Judge Hand himself rejected custom as a defense because he believed that 
industry customs will be insufficient to protect third parties.155 In contract 
law, judges may prefer to rely on more traditional methods of contractual 
interpretation, such as scrutinizing the evidentiary record for the intentions of 
the parties, which may deviate from custom. These approaches can lead to 
different levels of liability. In tort law, if an industry adopts a common 
practice that externalizes harm on third parties, then a court that defers to 
custom will hold liable only the worst offenders, while a court that uses a 
cost-benefit test may end up holding liable everyone or nearly everyone in 
the industry. 
 In theory, custom can be efficient, or otherwise desirable, but even its 
major defenders agree that the conditions under which it is efficient are 
limited.156 When an industry consists of similarly situated agents who enter 
into repeated interactions with each other—trading goods and services, for 
example—it is easy to see why, as a matter of theory, the customs they adopt 
might be welfare-maximizing for the group. But custom is less likely to be 
welfare-maximizing if the agents have different levels of wealth, market 
power, and sophistication, and especially when their customary behavior 
externalizes costs on third parties.157 An industry “custom” of discharging 
toxic waste in public waterways is hardly likely to be desirable from the social 
perspective. 
 Incorporation of custom into the common law offers an analogy to 
norming in agency regulation. In both cases, the legal decision-maker uses 
community standards—the “norms” of business behavior—to determine 
legal standards, and in doing so targets outliers while sparing the normal or 
above-normal firm from liability. Given that regulatory agencies have 
inherited many of the duties of the common law courts, it may be unsurprising 
that regulatory agencies have adopted a practice that has been common 
among those courts. But this is not to say that the practice is wise. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Many regulators engage in norming—setting regulatory standards on 
the basis of what existing firms are already doing. In some cases, norming is 
explicitly written into the statutes that authorize regulatory action; in other 
                                                 
155 The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2nd Cir. 1932). 
156 See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW (1991); Epstein, supra note 152, 
at 32. 
157 ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 37 (2002). 
39 
 
cases, agencies have adopted norming as a matter of their own discretion. In 
either case, the result is that agency regulation is often tethered closely to 
existing industry practice. 
 It is possible to mount a defense of norming as appropriate agency 
practice. If firms within an industry are already self-regulating in some 
manner, that is a strong indication that the regulation will provide at least 
some health and safety benefits without unduly harming the industry. An 
agency process of norming and re-norming over time could act as a ratchet, 
increasing the level of regulatory stringency in a manner that consistently 
passes a cost-benefit test. If agencies are trying to ensure that they first do no 
harm, there is a lot to be said for norming. 
 But norming is inferior to cost-benefit analysis. Norming unduly 
privileges the status quo; CBA does not. There is an irony in the fact that 
critics of CBA have long derided it as a tool used to block beneficial 
regulation.158 In fact, agencies themselves have hamstrung regulation by 
engaging in norming rather than following whatever regulatory course CBA 
would dictate. Perhaps this is the result of political necessity—perhaps 
agencies would struggle to promulgate regulations if they faced concerted 
opposition from every major firm each time they attempted to act. If so, those 
who favor stricter regulation should pressure agencies to rely on cost-benefit 
analysis. 
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